Reconstructing our National Narrative:
American Historiography at a Crossroads
By Jerry Prout

“A people without history is like a wind upon the buffalo
grass.” 1 Teton Sioux Saying

On October 6 1968, before the fifth game of the World Series, a
blind Puerto Rican singer sang a stylized version of the Star
Spangled Banner. The following day The New York Times reported
that Jose Feliciano’s “performance caused consternation and
criticism amongst television viewers throughout the nation.” 2
NBC’s New York office immediately reported some 400 calls. Across
the country the network’s affiliates were flooded with irate
messages. The interpretation of our sacred national song enraged
veterans groups, and the 23-year-old's performance, the first
nontraditional version of an anthem to be widely heard by
mainstream America, was retrospectively referred to as the
Lexington and Concord of Star-Spangled Banner controversies when
National Public Radio revisited it 38 years later. 3

It was estimated that, prior to Feliciano’s rendition, the
National Anthem had already endured over 1,000 different
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versions. 4 Feliciano’s was remarkable not only because it was
viewed by millions, but because it seemed oddly juxtaposed when
framed within the penultimate American sports event. Though
millions contemptuously thought Feliciano’s interpretation of the
anthem defamed a national icon, within a month RCA rushed the
live version into a record complete with the mixed crowd noises. 5

Feliciano’s rendition occurred only seven months after a South
Vietnamese General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the chief of the Saigon
national police, executed a National Liberation Front (NLF)
prisoner before a rolling camera in what H. Bruce Franklin called
“one of the most shocking, influential and enduring single images
from the Vietnam War.” 6

This single act further galvanized an

already burgeoning anti-war movement. And in many ways the
reaction became a complimenting subtext to Feliciano’s nontraditional approach to the National Anthem.

Both of these acts

were performed on a national stage and were viewed differently by
two parts of a divided nation, conflicted by the war, America’s
role in the world and an unsettled domestic landscape.

These images and others that cascaded in front of us during that
tumultuous Vietnam period, rekindled the conflicts that an
earlier “progressive school” of American historians always saw
lurking beneath the surface of our history. These were conflicts
a “consensus school” of historians in the period following World
War II were only temporarily able to reconcile under the banner
of an exceptional “American way of life.” In the paradoxes that
emerged in the tumultuous, reformist period of the 60’s, American
history, as Gary B. Nash writes, could no longer be made to be
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nice. 7 Nor could it be easily confined. Greil Marcus suggests it
could no longer be studied as a “little Peyton Place of the
mind.” It had come time to “study America, the whole shebang, in
all its imbecile complexity.” 8

The conflicting interpretations of the National Anthem and
Vietnam War within the context of this tempestuous period in
American history are forever crystallized in these two discrete
black and white images. In her work Prosthetic Memory, Alison
Landsberg asks whether the projection of such imagery by mass
technology upon our collective consciousness can actually have a
role in the construction of a more tolerant and accepting
national ethos. In her view, mass culture has the potential to so
commoditize a society’s memories that we have the very real
potential to share in one another’s ethnicity, pain and values.
Landsberg asks whether electronic culture can help shape a shared
ethos and a more unified community by its use of imagery. Can our
collective experience of technologically projected sights and
sounds act as a sort of prosthesis that helps eradicate the
differences that have traditionally marked the human condition?
In this way can mass technology create a more “socially
responsible” culture? 9

The conflicts in interpretation of the Feliciano and Nguyen
images would seem to dictate otherwise. At the time, the imagery
divided more than it united. And yet against the predominant
traditions of American historiography these contemporaneous
reactions are both explainable and predictable.
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Then and now, these images serve to remind us that left
unexplained, the impressions of any period are chaotic,
contradictory and confusing. Post modern U.S. historiography, it
will be argued here, has greatly enriched and enlightened our
understanding of specific cultural phenomenon from our collective
past, though often in very narrowly confined temporal and spatial
dimensions. As broadening as these studies are to our vertical
understanding of specific periods, places and people, they now
need to enlighten our horizontal understanding of the broader
themes that unify our American experience.

As historians we have a critical role, if not obligation, to help
interpret the dissonant imagery that comes to us when we train
our eyes on any period. The images of Feliciano and Nguyen still
stare at us almost two generations later begging us to sort
through the conflicted imagery of a past still clouded by too
vivid memories.

We are at a juncture in U.S. historiography, it

will be argued, where our penchant to sift meticulously through
the rubble of the past, and micro analyze its granularity, is
beginning to threaten our ability to form a broader integrative
narrative and fulfill history’s role in the development of a
widely shared national ethos.

In examining the American past, our historiography has typically
alternated between consensus and conflict.
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War I, American historiography was largely a celebration of the
similarities in the American tradition; or, at the very least
history’s role was to promote a perception of a shared American
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Enlightenment imperative that affirmed the past could be reduced
to a series of immutable facts, if not truths. As Peter Novick
incisively offers, the cozy atmosphere of those few scholars who
defined what was appropriate made it possible to define
objectivity because there was a shared agreement on “a history:”
No community can be satisfied that its discourse is
objective---or even know what it would mean to be
objective---without substantial agreement on values, goals
and perceptions. 11
Thus the debate over the objectivity of historical endeavor which
predominated at the time the American Historical Association was
founded (1884), was in some ways moot due to the homogeneity in
background of those practicing the craft. History as practiced by
the Bancrofts, Motley’s, Parkman’s and Prescott’s at the turn of
the century was largely a unified history because these were all
Harvard graduates from New England backgrounds. As John Higham
has suggested, American history was the story of “… freedom
realized and stabilized through the achievement of national
solidarity.” 12

But within a period of sixty years from the AHA’s founding
American history underwent very different treatments by two
contrasting historiographical traditions, one emphasizing
conflict and tension in the American tradition, the other based
on a consensual meta-narrative that emphasized the inherent
ability of America to subsume conflict. The progressive
historical school of Turner, Robinson, Beard and Becker, focused
on the “discontinuity” of the past” and gravitated toward a neoMarxian view of the class conflict in U.S. history, that “give(s)
the language of social conflict a distinctively American
inflection.” 13
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By contrast, the consensual school that emerged post World War
II, was marked by the publication of Richard Hofstadter’s
American Political Tradition in 1948.

The consensus school

sought to subsume the conflicts inherent in progressive
historiography into a broader conception of the exceptional
American ethos. In the aftermath of post World War II, this
approach to American history gave special emphasis to our unique
heritage based upon a Lockean liberal consensus of property and
individual rights.

Unlike the Progressivism of Beard or Van

Woodward, which stressed the conflict inherent in our economic
and societal structure, the consensus historians sought to
project how America was spared the feudal traditions of Europe
and thus did not possess a conflict ridden, class oriented
society. This lack of class ridden antagonism was complimented by
a rational democratic political order built upon Lockean notions
of property rights and individual liberty (at least for most
white males). 14

What was consistent historiographically with both these schools
of American history was the conceit that the “big truths” of
history were so self-evident that, by a communitarian criterion
of the truth, to be within the consensus was ceteris paribus to
be objective.” The triumph of the consensus school, at least so
they thought, was in sustaining their view of “a variegated
people held together by a unifying ideology or a common way of
life.” 15 Hofstadter proclaimed that the “rediscovery of complexity
in American history was the greatest achievement in postwar
historiography.” 16

That the consensus school thought they could

find unifying themes midst this complexity stands in stark
contrast to what was soon to follow.
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For with the watershed publication of Lawrence Levine’s Black
Culture and Black Consciousness in 1977, a new period in American
historiography emerged.

The narrative of the “American

consensus” was challenged and the field embarked on what
unfortunately has come to be termed a “deconstructionist” phase.
This is an unfortunate label because the new historiography is
deconstructionist only in the sense that it challenges the
artificial constructions of the consensus historical school and
pushes against the bipolar constraints of the progressives.

More

constructively what the post moderns have done in the last 30
years is to reestablish and illuminate the sense of remarkable
complexity that Hofstadter himself had found beneath the surface
of consensus.

For the post moderns no subject escaped the camera’s lens
(Nguyen) or was beyond the singer’s interpretive range
(Feliciano).

Levine, and soon his myriad new school disciples,

noting that “historians are the prisoners of their impoverished
sense of sources and historical subject matter,”

17

sought to open

the doors on new research material and give voice to the
narratives of those left by the curb of American historiography.
The result was a deconstructionist, post modern explosion of
cultural and intellectual treatments of what Nan Enstad has
appropriately and ironically (given its association with British
imperialistic military structure) termed “subaltern” history:

In recent years, a dynamic multi racial cultural history
has emerged from the continuing development of
Latina/Latino, Asian American, Native American, African
American, gender and sexual histories, from the challenges
to the fixed nature categories, and from the notions of

17

Nan Enstad, “On Grief and Complicity: Notes toward a Visionary
Cultural History. Forthcoming in Cook, Glickman and O’Malley eds., The
Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past Present and Future (Chicago,
2007),p.6.

7

borders and empires as they shaped the identities of
residents and migrants. 18

In the post Vietnam era, we have surely expanded our
consciousness of the breadth and depth of history in ways that
even Levine might not have been able to grasp. It is from the
heights rather than the depths of this new platform that we can
now more fully address the seemingly dissonant underlying
subtexts such as Feliciano’s rendition of the National Anthem or
more fully comprehend the significance of Nguyen’s Vietnamese
street assassination. Rather than foreclose the possibility of a
new approach to American history, the post modern school actually
unlocked the very possibility; one yet to be realized.

So how is a unifying American narrative to be discerned and
redefined from the now growing body of granular analyses and the
exploding number of post modernist “period” pieces that address
various cultural phenomena from prostitution to minstrelsy?

For

example, we can marvel at the precision with which Elizabeth
Blackman in her 1990 work Manhatten for Rent (to pick one from
this genre’) peers into the dustiest archival data on property
ownership, floor plans, and city directories to bring us a
masterful analysis of “class geography” in ante bellum America.
Certainly the fecundity of such highly focused treatments, done
over the last thirty years have significantly enriched the
potential to understand our past and begin to conceive how a new
meta-narrative might emerge. The scholarship is in many cases
stunning in its depth, taking us down deep silos to the grainiest
of micro-revelations and in the descent, leaving traditionalist
white man’s history in the dust.

But do these works collectively

constitute enough of the sort of “thick description” that we need
to begin to resurrect a coherent American ethos?
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In his classic work The Interpretation of Cultures the
anthropologist Clifford Geertz addresses the very tension between
the “thick description” of the astute ethnographer, and the role
of cultural anthropology to ascribe meaning to observation. As
Geertz says, “it is not necessary to know everything in order to
understand something.” Perhaps more relevant to the dilemmas that
the historical method shares with that of the cultural
anthropologist, is the temptation to concentrate ever so finely
upon the minute so that any sense of the interpretive is buried
in the descriptive. And yet, at the same time, Geertz
persuasively argues, the generality of theory cannot obliterate
the specific of observation. Thus Geertz would suggest that we
need always be mindful of the ongoing tension between the
empirical and the theoretical and that the balance in describing
culture is ever so subtle: “What generality it contrives to
achieve grows out of the delicacy of its distinctions, not the
sweep of its abstractions.” 19 So when Geertz in his classic work
writes about the cock fight in Bali, this tension between the
objective and the abstract is in full view and the delta between
the two always credible.

He can derive a unique Indonesian

cultural ethos from the observation of Balinese males in this
ritual, “paradigmatic, human event,” 20 because his interpretation
seldom strays very far from the events or their description.

If as historians we are to be able to explain why America would
so deeply divide over the imagery of Feliciano and Nguyen, we
need be mindful of the tightrope Geertz walks. We need recognize
what happens when the historian assumes too much the role of
novelist or public intellectual, and less the role of the
enlightened Baconian scientist or investigative journalist; too
much the story teller and not the fact finder? The historical
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literature is littered with the results of those who seek to use
selective historical facts for their own ideological purposes.

In reacting to the “granularity” of post-modernism we can tip the
scale too far and quickly fall into the genre of politicizing our
past. For example, Civil War history has been a magnet for the
editorialist as historian seeking refuge in overt “historicism.”
David Blight depicts the nostalgic confusion that occurred in
post-Civil War America as individuals on both sides of the Mason
Dixon line let their current perspectives shape their views of
the recent past. The Reconstruction fell woefully short of
providing finality; indeed serving to exacerbate the underlying
divisions between races and regions and allow selective memories
of the war to cascade into the next century and this one as well.

Most notably beyond the concrete memorialization of the victims
of the War, this irresolution gave birth to the mythology of the
Lost Cause, a genre of historical revisionism that became a “full
fledged mythology across American society.”

21

The historical

tributes to the Lost Cause came to occupy a large space between
the cynicism of Ambrose Bierce’s depictions of the atrocity and
emptiness of the war, and the “cause lost” realism of W.E. B. Du
Bois’s masterwork Black Reconstruction in America.

The Myth of the Lost Cause gripped the South in the wake of
Reconstruction and emerged as a force that, as Rollin Osterweis
argues, could allow this defeated region and “way of life” to do
in peace what it had been unable to do in war,

“overcome the

victor.” 22 The South would indeed rise again propelled by this
revisionist view of its noble history. So large was this
sentimentalist approach to the past that its grip extended well
into Northern states, and as Blight has suggested became “a tonic
21
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against fear of social change,” 23

as a wave of industrialization,

immigration and geographic mobility predominated at the turn of
the century.

No single feature of the Lost Cause Mythology was more powerful
than the apotheosis of Robert E. Lee as the dignified fallen
leader of the cause itself.

In the example of Lee the danger of

superimposing the historical needs of the present upon the past
becomes abundantly clear. For the Lost Cause historicists who
sought to continue to project the Confederate cause in spite of
their military defeat were able to enlist the imagery of the
gentlemanly Lee as a way to reestablish its justness of their
cause. Among the most unabashed Lee apologists was Douglas
Southall Freeman, editor of the Richmond News Leader, who
solidified the General’s image in a series of articles and a
biography that “marbleized” and created a canon of Lee imagery
that caused Freeman to become “impatient with those who sought to
investigate more deeply.” 24

The “Lost Cause” approach to the past, as used here, is meant to
refer to a fundamentally flawed historiographical approach that
seeks to impose a theory of how the present might best be
explained, or lived, by selectively and conveniently
reconstructing the memories of the past. Using this method, the
facts are redesigned to conform to a specific ideology or
theology of the present. The school of sentimentalist, Lost Cause
historians are significant here for the method they used rather
than to any real contribution to our understanding of the Civil
War or its aftermath.

The concern is that historical accounts

that fall into this “Lost Cause” genre, those with predetermined
narratives in search of the supporting facts, are still very much
with us. So while this approach may give us tempting narratives
23
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to reconcile the conflicting reactions to Nguyen and Feliciano,
the integration and unification it allows are at the steep price
of accuracy and empirical truth.

Today, for example, the Lost Cause approach is evident both in
the “Noble Cause” revisionism of Vietnam War history and the
reaction this revisionism has produced as manifest in works such
as The Spitting Image (Jerry Lembcke) and Vietnam and Other
American Fantasies (H. Bruce Franklin).

The divide between these

ideological interpretations of the Vietnam War is very similar to
those so-called histories that followed in the immediate
aftermath of the Civil War. And in the case of Vietnam, they are
as divisive as the War was itself to the American polity. As
Lembcke so insightfully concludes, how we remember Vietnam is
becoming increasingly important not just for the sake of
historical accuracy, but because it goes to the very essence of
what historians offer in the ongoing debate over what it means
“to be a good American:”
Reclaiming our memory of the Vietnam era entails a struggle
against powerful institutional forces that toy with our
imaginings of the war for reasons of monetary, political,
or professional gain. It is a struggle for our individual
and collective identities that calls us to reappropriate
the making of our own memories. It is a struggle of epic
importance. 25
These new Vietnam interpretations, arguably too close to their
subject period, like other Lost Cause approaches, do not
illuminate the past. Rather as Lembcke himself suggests, they
move us farther away from a more dispassionate view of what
actually occurred during the Vietnam era. They leave the
conflicting reactions to the imagery of Nguyen and Feliciano in
tact and in fact exacerbate the underlying tensions.
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Thus Vietnam, like the Civil War, provokes nostalgic revisionism,
and is a tempting target for those who want history to be shaped
to advance political and ideological agendas.

And like the

Civil War, with emotions still raw thirty years since it ended,
Vietnam is an example of how current context may be
inappropriately used to advance historical interpretation over
historical evidence; to put the narrative ahead of the gathering
of fact. But it is hardly the only example of the dangers
inherent in contextualized history.

The inappropriate filter of contemporary context is central to
the Lost Cause approach to historiography. Jane Tompkins is among
the most adamant in the belief that in historical analyses,
context has a too dominant influence and one that is hard to
ameliorate. She notes historians need to be keenly vigilant of
the way decisions and judgments (in her case those regarding what
literary works were to be included in the forming of the 19th
century American literary canon) are handed down to us through
generations. For Tompkins it is essential to parse through the
hegemony of bias that captures any period, “because looking is
not an activity that is performed outside of political struggles
and institutional structures, but arise from them.”

26

Being able to sort through the influences a given period has on
how its memories are projected and thus how they are subsequently
received becomes a paramount factor in the pursuit of accuracy.
Historical treatments of the Holocaust present real insight into
the dangers contextualization pose for the historian.

Dismissing

the fringe conspiracy theories that question the very historical
reality of the Holocaust, the more vexing issue is how the
Holocaust has been assigned an importance, or as Peter Novick
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would put it, has moved from the margins of American
consciousness to the center.

To draw from the approach Tompkins’s has applied to “great”
literature, it is clear that the Holocaust’s plot line, like that
of any classic novel, has not changed. What have changed are the
circumstances (or context)that suddenly elevate the event to
occupying a space in our collective memory.

And Novick

attributes this sudden ascendancy of the event not to any new
discovery of its horrid dimensions, but rather to a complicated
set of factors that formed a new context in which its is viewed,
among them a post Vietnam “victimization syndrome,” the fear
among Jewish leaders that their Jewishness was being subsumed by
a more diverse American culture, and the media’s projection of
the Holocaust through news documentaries and mini-series. To
paraphrase Novick, it is not that the Holocaust changed, but
rather we did.

The challenges of elevating above context and cause are
formidable for historians seeking to reconcile the conflicted
imagery of any period. But as the post modern era reaches a sort
of stasis, American historiography is at a tipping point. We
remain vexed by the challenge of how to better explain the images
of Feliciano and Nguyen and more importantly why they evoked such
dissonant reactions. The challenge is to clearly place their
images in the larger sweep of American history divorced from
context or cause. So what methodology should we adapt that brings
rigor to our analysis and overcomes the burden of context and
cause?

Marilyn Young argues that “the essential American meta-narrative
has traditionally been based on a belief in the fulfillment, over
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time, of the enduring principles of the Founding Fathers.” 27 That
simple statement implies that the fulfillment itself is indeed a
continuing struggle and that we are defined more in the journey
toward their attainment.

This existential view is akin to that

put forward by one of the leading consensus historians, Louis
Hartz, who saw America always differentiating and distancing
itself from Europe by its adherence to principles of Lockean
idealism.

Hartz and others in the consensus school were not

enamored with using conflict as a way to structure the narrative
of American history, and in fact insightfully noted that the
Progressives had their own Hegelian model to overcome the
conflicts they were so ready to portray:
Actually there was amid all the smoke and flame of
Progressive historical scholarship a continuous and almost
complacent note of reassurance. A new Jefferson would arise
as he had always arisen before. The “reactionaries” (i.e.,
Hamilton) would be laid low again. 28
In short, even the Progressive school saw arising out of the
constant conflicts in our history a new synthesis which, as the
consensus school was obliged to point out, resulted from that
unifying subtext that seems to underlie the exceptional American
narrative.

But for us today, having come full blown into the post-modern
period, placing the increasingly complicated and conflicted new
revelations of historical fact into the neat and clean basket of
the Lockean- Republican democratic ideal is becoming ever more
challenging.

The legacies of slave masters’ tortuous practices,

the no-nothing’s harassment of immigrants, or the industry
captain’s heavy handed treatment of labor organizers, are but a
few among many episodes difficult to reconcile with the liberal
traditions of the Founders. And the continuing examination of
27
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resistance to equal rights for African Americans, Native
Americans, and women, whose own narratives have been so recently
enriched by the post-modernists, also poses a challenge for
contemporary historians seeking a new paradigm that will more
fully explain and unify our historical experience. Recent
accounts of these struggles have become the “inconvenient truths”
which we need to reconcile. These are the lurking shadows in the
Feliciano and Nguyen images that are begging us to weave a new
meta-narrative that will help us deal with the irony of the past
and overcome the tendency to view them as backwaters rather than
integral to the mainstream of our history.

Joyce Appleby and her colleagues have described “the urgency each
generation feels to possess the past in terms meaningful to it.” 29
But in the wake of post modernism how should that meaning be
reassembled? Post modernism has offered analysis rather than
synthesis, and in the process caused a puerile counter-reaction
in the recent political assaults on the historical profession
itself as lacking any standards or beliefs.

Indeed post

modernism has irritated a cadre of traditionalists who view postmodernism as failing to enrich our understanding of forgotten
American narratives, and instead disassembling long held American
mythologies, including the bedrock notion of progress itself. So
the traditionalists characterize post modernism as:

…insist(ing) that the experiences of genocide, world wars,
depressions, pollution, and famine have cast doubt on the
inevitability of progress, enlightenment and reason, even
while they implicitly deny human access to certain
knowledge of these same disasters. 30
Against the backdrop of this traditionalist critique it is
legitimate to ask how historians should now proceed to synthesize
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a broader narrative; to build upon the richness of post modern
studies rather than simply critique its effects.

Simply continuing to critique post-modernism not only
unnecessarily politicizes the study of history but misses the
fundamental issue. For the valued contribution of post modern
relativism is a fecundity of new racial, ethnic and gender
narratives, as well as an explosion in cultural histories that
upend long held beliefs about traditional power structures in
America. Collectively these have a feeling of standing apart from
one another; disconnected from what we conceive to be part of a
more traditional American narrative.

Standing on their own they

are often profoundly insightful, but toward what end?

In the

post-modernist, multicultural genre, the challenge is how to
avoid a multiculturalism that simply panders to the desires of
every sub-group in our society to know its own past, and instead
use weave a broader narrative about of how each of us carries a
“complex fusion of cultural identities and attitudes” 31 that has
enriched our historical experience and indeed does argue for its
exceptionality. Before too quickly discarding the protests of
those historical traditionalists who see in the post modernists a
simple obsession to elevate separate histories and a dangerous
trend toward historical relativism that tears at the national
fiber, we need ask ourselves the relevant question: How can we
put together a more encompassing narrative that addresses these
concerns?

History, as Nash reminds us, is almost always a means of
furthering a sense of national self, a way to “promote national
cohesion and civic pride. 32

Historians, though clearly limited by

their own historical contexts, nonetheless possess an enormous
responsibility to forming our concepts of community and nation.
If a new conceptualization of the underlying sentiment and
31
32
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morality that informs our beliefs, practices, and customs (i.e.,
a national ethos) is to emerge, then historians share a large
part of the burden of helping shape our understanding of how a
newly defined ethos is consistent with our variegated past.

Thirty nine years after the images of Feliciano and Nguyen, we
can be far more comfortable with a narrative that can explain the
conflicts they stirred. Their images have given way to new ones
that reveal much about what we have become in the intervening
years, and how our national ethos has expanded, in no small part
to the bounds broken by reformist historians, in ways the white
“Founding Fathers” might find ironic, though nonetheless
pleasing.

In the wake of our Vietnam experience, whether tragic or noble,
our national ethos now allows us now to fully engage a communist
country our President has admiringly called a “young tiger.”

And

so in November 2006, in a supreme irony of the present, a
President engaged on his own mission for democracy can stand
smiling beneath the statue of Ho Chi Minh in an economically
vibrant, communist country which we recently engaged in a free
trade agreement.

And similarly, in this same month, in the

continuing national struggle to accept all peoples as equal and
to honor their disparate voices__ even the echoes of a blind,
Hispanic singer 38 years ago__ perhaps we now can better
understand the emotion of Andrew Young sobbing on the shoulder of
Jesse Jackson at the dedication of the new Martin Luther King
Memorial on the national mall.

18

Perhaps then, as historians, we are that point when the multiple
and disparate symbols that mark the underlying ethos of our own
age can be synthesized into a broader meta-narrative that
captures and reformulates our national ethos in ways made far
richer and fuller by the deconstructionist histories of the last
thirty years. The challenge becomes how to arrive at a new
consensus without creating a new consensus school.

How to find

solid ground again when the post modernists have created a
prevailing relativism?
confronted by the

It is not a dilemma dissimilar to one

Metaphysical Club of Boston in the 1870’s in

addressing the prevailing “agnosticism” of its day. 33

Perhaps

then, current historians might do well to ponder the approach
taken by the intellectual forefather of pragmatism and one of the
Club’s founders.

Charles S. Peirce was at his core an empiricist and tolerated no
views that were not grounded on some hard empirical research. But
he also was tolerant of divergent views that emerged from similar
empirical observation.

And in taking the next step to discern

some broader truth from “higglety pigglety” of reality, Peirce
noted the need for “solidarity among competing views.”

In

Peirce’s construct, truth derives from the “opinion which is
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate.” 34 This
is no mean task for American historians, since their
interpretations of America in the past are inextricably bound up
in their views of America at present. But here is where the
historian must separate from the propagandist, editorialist and
pundit, in order to get the story out of history rather than
superimposing an ideology (i.e., The Lost Cause) on our past.

33

Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Company, 2001) p. 201-210.
34
Novick, pp.570-72.
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Moreover, if at this particular juncture our history is only
further deconstructed by ever more finite analyses of minute
“aspects” of the past, it will becomes more and more like a
sophisticated ethnographic chronicle than a historical narrative.
This would indeed be unfortunate since, as Hayden White suggests
in The Content of Form:
Historical discourse is a privileged instantiation of the
human capacity to endow the experience of time with
meaning, because the immediate referent of this discourse
is real, rather than imaginary events. 35
White positions historical narrative at the pinnacle of the
hierarchy of story telling. Telling the story of the past is not
a passive chronicling, nor a scientific endeavor. Rather it
possesses a unique space that should be larger not smaller. It is
as White concludes the ability to simultaneously experience time
in the past, present and future tense.

Surely, a new meta-narrative of our national history that
credibly unifies the dissonant chords of post modernist
interpretation will emerge, just as surely as the consensus
school followed the progressives. Ideally it will be one that
does not leave us in the rich rubble of post modernism or unable
to explain the ironies of the past. Nor will it be one that
superimposes interpretation over the solidity of the evidence.
Rather it will be a historical narrative that sees in the images
of Feliciano and Young, Nguyen and Bush a wonderful symmetry in
the space of our recent history, and reflective of unifying
themes that come to us as myth and symbol that need to be
debunked or explained.

35

White p.173.
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